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Rafał Bajczuk
Germany’s current energy strategy, known as the “energy transition”, or Energiewende, 
involves an accelerated withdrawal from the use of nuclear power plants and the development 
of renewable energy sources (RES). According to the government’s plans, the share of RES 
in electricity production will gradually increase from its present rate of 26% to 80% in 2050. 
Greenhouse gas emissions are expected to fall by 80–95% by 2050 when compared to 1990 
levels. However, coal power plants still predominate in Germany’s energy mix – they produced 
44% of electricity in 2014 (26% from lignite and 18% from hard coal). This makes it difficult to 
meet the emission reduction objectives, lignite combustion causes the highest levels of green-
house gas emissions. In order to reach the emission reduction goals, the government launched 
the process of accelerating the reduction of coal consumption. On 2 July, the Federal Ministry 
for Economic Affairs and Energy published a plan to reform the German energy market which 
will be implemented during the present term of government. Emission reduction from coal 
power plants is the most important issue. This problem has been extensively discussed over 
the past year and has transformed into a conflict between the government and the coal lobby. 
The dispute reached its peak when lignite miners took to the streets in Berlin. As the govern-
ment admits, in order to reach the long-term emission reduction objectives, it is necessary to 
completely liquidate the coal energy industry in Germany. This is expected to take place within 
25 to 30 years. However, since the decision to decommission nuclear power plants was passed, 
the German ecological movement and the Green Party have shifted their attention to coal po-
wer plants, demanding that these be decommissioned by 2030 at the latest. 
The problem with reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020
Climate policy is the source of the internal Ger-
man conflict over lignite. Germany is among 
those countries (along with e.g. the United King-
dom, France and the countries of Scandinavia) 
which are most strongly engaged in the global 
reduction of greenhouse gases. In 2007, Berlin 
unilaterally adopted the goal to reduce emissions 
by 40% by 2020, compared to 1990 levels1. Ho-
1 Klimaagenda 2020: Der Umbau der Industriege-
sellschaft, April 2007, http://www.bmub.bund.de/filead-
min/bmu-import/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/
hintergrund_klimaagenda.pdf
wever carbon emissions were falling at a slower 
rate than expected, and even rose in 2011–2013. 
There were several reasons for this trend, the 
most important being increased power produc-
tion by coal power plants after eight nuclear po-
wer plants were decommissioned following the 
Fukushima disaster. The decision to withdraw 
from the use of nuclear power plants coincided 
with the shale revolution in the USA, which led 
to a reduction in demand for coal and, consequ-
ently, falling gas prices on the global market. 
This led to an increased share of coal in electri-
city production in EU member states, including 
Germany. This trend coincided with the fall in pri-
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ces of carbon allowances in the EU emission tra-
de system resulting in increased production of 
energy from lignite in Germany. In effect, even 
though in 2010–2013 electricity consumption in 
Germany fell by 15% and electricity production 
using RES increased by 47%, energy production 
from coal also rose by 23% and thus contributed 
to higher carbon emissions. Hence the “Ener-
gy Transition Paradox” mentioned by German 
experts – even though energy production with 
the use of emission-free renewable sources has 
been developing at a rapid rate, carbon emission 
levels have been growing. Already in 2013, Pe-
ter Altmaier (CDU), who was then the minister 
for the Environment, said that Germany wo-
uld not be able to reach the goal of reducing 
emissions by 40% by 2020. However, when the 
government changed, the Social Democrats be-
came the new coalition partners for the Chri-
stian Democrats and forced the coalition to set 
the goal of a 40% emission reduction by 2020. 
SPD politicians were nominated Minister for Eco-
nomic Affairs and Energy and Minister for the 
Environment. In December 2014, the govern-
ment adopted the Action Programme on Cli-
mate Protection 20202. The document specified 
a number of actions to be taken in order to re-
duce emissions in individual sectors, including 
the power production sector which accounts 
for 40% of greenhouse gas emissions in Germa-
2 Rafał Bajczuk, ‘Niemieckie problemy z redukcją emisji 
CO2’ OSW Commentary, 16 December 2014, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2014-12-16/
niemieckie-problemy-z-redukcja-emisji-co2
ny. Carbon emissions are expected to have fal-
len to 749 million tonnes in Germany by 2020 
(in 2013 they reached 951 million tonnes). Ac-
cording to most recent Eurostat data (for 2012), 
Germany is EU’s largest greenhouse gas emit-
ter and accounts for 20.6% of all emissions. In 
this ranking, Germany is followed by the United 
Kingdom (13.1%), France (11%), Italy (10%) and 
Poland (8.6%). German emissions per capita are 
above the EU average level of 9 tonnes of CO2 
equivalent per capita annually. As compared to 
Germany (11.4 tonnes), emissions are higher only 
in the Czech Republic (12.5 tonnes), Ireland (12.8 
tonnes), Estonia (14.5 tonnes) and Luxembourg 
(22.6 tonnes)3. Poland (10.4 tonnes) has lower 
emissions per capita than Germany. 
The dispute over the climate levy
On 27 March 2015, the Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Energy led by Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) 
presented a plan for reforming the energy mar-
ket with the proposal to impose a carbon emis-
sions tax on coal power plants, the so-called 
‘climate levy’ (German Klimaabgabe). Accor-
ding to the government’s proposal, a levy of 
18–20 euros per tonne of CO2 would be impo-
sed on old coal power plants in operation for 
more than 20 years. In the ministry’s opinion, 
this proposal would bring the following positi-
ve effects: it would eliminate the oldest coal po-
wer plants from the market and reduce power 
exports, since excessive electricity production 
has destabilised the market in Germany and 
neighbouring countries (in the past few years 
Germany sold the largest amount of electricity 
in its history)4. This proposal was received po-
sitively by organisations involved in the protec-
tion of environment, scientists, the RES lobby, 
and municipal companies. 
3 Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
index.php/Greenhouse_gas_emission_statistics#Main_tables
4 See Agora Energiewende, Neuer Rekord beim Stromex-
port, 17 July 2015, http://www.agora-energiewende.
de/de/presse/agoranews/news-detail/news/1-neuer-re-
kord-beim-stromexport/News/detail/
The CDU/CSU–SPD coalition government 
has set itself the goal of reducing green-
house gas emissions by 40% by 2020 
when compared to 1990 levels. By the end 
of the decade emissions are to decline by 
21% from 951 million tonnes in 2013 to 
749 million tonnes.
3OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 188
Energy producers, trade unions and some politi-
cians from the Christian Democratic and Social 
Democratic parties have reacted negatively to this 
proposal. It has been argued that the imposition 
of additional taxes on coal power plants will lead 
to job losses and the collapse of the lignite sector5. 
It has also been argued that power supplies could 
be interrupted if too many coal power plants di-
scontinued operation within a timeframe of seve-
ral years. Opponents of the tax on power plants 
could count on support from politicians. Their 
demands were backed by politicians from all par-
ties, with the exception of the Greens. Politicians 
from the SPD (including the ministers-president of 
North Rhine-Westphalia and Brandenburg) and 
the CDU have been especially active. Lobbyists 
representing the coal energy sector, including 
Peter Terium, the CEO of RWE, Hildegard Müller, 
the head of the German Association of Energy 
and Water Industries (BDEW) and Stanislaw Til-
lich (CDU), the minister-president of Saxony, took 
part in the talks on the struggle to continue ligni-
te production in North Rhine-Westphalia during 
a convention of CDU politicians from this federal 
state on 23 April. The coalition partners from the 
CDU/CSU also lobbied against Gabriel’s idea in 
parliament, where 14 MPs published an open let-
ter to Chancellor Angela Merkel. There was also 
a demonstration by 15,000 trade union activists, 
who took to the streets on 25 April in Berlin to 
protest against the climate fee, which marked 
a breakthrough in this dispute. 
5 The trade unions claimed that 100,000 people could 
lose their jobs. The press release from the Federal Lig-
nite Association of 15 April 2015 states that the coal tax 
may lead to the liquidation of 40,000 jobs in the lignite 
sector; http://www.presseportal.de/pm/9341/2997191
Following the attack from the industry, the tra-
de unions and CDU/CSU and SPD politicians, the 
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy led by 
Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) halted its efforts to impo-
se the climate levy on coal power plants. A new 
proposal to reduce emissions from coal power 
plants was published on 2 July as a Political 
Agreement between the SPD, the CDU and the 
CSU on the Future of the Energy Transition6. Ac-
cording to the agreement, lignite power plants 
with a capacity of 2.7 GW (i.e. 13% of the ca-
pacity of German lignite power plants) will be 
classified as the so-called emergency standby 
‘reserve’. This means that these power plants 
will only be put into operation in emergency 
situations, when the remaining power plants 
operating on the market are unable to cope 
with demand. The coal power plants classified 
as the power reserve will receive compensation 
for remaining on standby for four years, and 
will then be closed. The ministry’s new proposal 
will result in a reduction of carbon emissions by 
power plants – 11 million tonnes by 2020. The 
original plans envisaged a reduction in carbon 
emissions 22 million tonnes by 2020. The emis-
sion reduction goal as a whole is to be reached 
by increased energy saving and the construction 
of new combined heat and power plants. This 
solution will require additional budget subsi-
dies on energy efficiency (around 1.2 billion eu-
ros annually), and on the development of com-
bined heat and power plants (around 0.5 billion 
euros annually). Experts estimate that the costs 
of the so-called ‘power reserve’ for energy con-
sumers will reach 0.5–1 billion euros annually7.
The decision to pay power plant operators for 
remaining on standby has provoked radically 
6 Eckpunkte für eine erfolgreiche Umsetzung der En-
ergiewende Politische Vereinbarungen der Parteivor-
sitzenden von CDU, CSU und SPD vom 1. Juli 2015, 
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/E /eck-
punkte-energiewende,property=pdf,bereich=bm-
wi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf
7 Teurer Klimaschutz mit Kapazitätsreserve, Forum Ökolo-
gisch-Soziale Marktwirtschaft, June 2015, p. 5, https://www.
greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/publications/
teurer_klimaschutz_mit_kapazitatsreserve_201506.pdf
Due to lobbying from German industry as-
sociations and business-oriented factions 
of the CDU, the government has given up 
the climate tax from lignite power plants.
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different reactions. Some experts and ecological 
organisations have criticised the government for 
caving in to the coal lobby and for breaking the-
ir word. Opinions could be heard in the media 
that the image of Germany as a country enga-
ged in an ambitious climate policy had been tar-
nished. In turn, chambers of industry and trade 
unions have expressed a positive opinion about 
this plan. According to the German Institute for 
Economic Research, the government’s energy po-
licy is inefficient because clients will have to in-
cur the additional costs of the ‘disability pension’ 
paid to coal power plants, and the risk will rema-
in that the emission reduction target will not be 
achieved8. The government’s withdrawal from its 
plans needs to be viewed as a failure of the SPD’s 
energy and climate policy. The main argument ra-
ised by the opponents of the climate fee, i.e. the 
risk of bankruptcy of the lignite sector, has not 
been confirmed in the expert opinion from the 
Federal Environment Agency9. The fact that coal 
power plants have been classified as a power re-
serve needs to be viewed as an economic success 
of the CDU, which has from the very beginning 
protested against the proposal of the Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and Energy to impose the cli-
mate fee on the oldest coal power plants. 
8 A press release from the German Institute for Economic 
Research on 24 June 2015: Klimabeitrag kann CO2-Emis-
sionen im Stromsektor effektiv und kostengünstig sen-
ken – Alternative Vorschläge ineffektiv und teuer http://
www.diw.de/de/diw_01.c.509353.de/themen_nach-
richten/klimabeitrag_kann_co2_emissionen_im_strom-
sektor_effektiv_und_kostenguenstig_senken_alterna-
tive_vorschlaege_ineffektiv_und_teuer.html
9 Klimabeitrag: Jobverluste in der Braunkohle kaum zu 
befürchten, 24 May 2015, http://www.umweltbundes-
amt.de/themen/klimabeitrag-jobverluste-in-der-braun-
kohle-kaum-zu
The place of coal in the German economy
Hard coal used to be the basis of the German 
economy. Up until the mid 1960s (see Appen-
dix), the German energy sector, heating sector 
and railway transport heavily relied on hard coal 
and, to some extent,  lignite. One proof that 
coal was so important is the fact that one of 
the main goals of the European Coal and Steel 
Community was to limit Germany’s advantage 
in European coal deposits. In 1956 (when coal 
consumption reached its peak in Germany), 
86% of the energy used was produced from 
German coal, most of which was mined in the 
Ruhr region (71% from hard coal and 15% from 
lignite). Subsequently, hard coal mining began 
to fall back relatively rapidly, and coal’s share 
in energy production was nearly halved within 
the next twenty years. This happened for many 
reasons, the most important of which were: the 
depletion of easily accessible coal deposits in 
Germany, the introduction of substitute fuels to 
the market (crude oil, natural gas and nuclear 
energy), greater accessibility to imported coal 
and the environmental protection issue (during 
the combustion process coal emits more pollu-
tion than oil or gas). Between 1960 and 1970, 
the number of working miners fell from aro-
und 505,000 to around 242,000. Since hard 
coal production generated losses, subsidies for 
this sector were first introduced in 1974, and 
reached their highest level in 1996, when the 
federal and local budgets offered subsidies 
worth 8.27 billion euros to the coal sector, 
i.e. 97,000 euros per employee. The subsidy le-
vels have been falling since then, and German 
hard coal mining is supported mainly for wel-
fare reasons (retention of workplaces) and has 
nothing in common with energy security. In 
1997, 2003 and 2007, the German government 
signed agreements with mining organisations 
envisaging a reduction of output and a gradu-
al winding up of the mines. The most recent 
agreement provides that subsidies to hard coal 
mines will only be paid until the end of 2018, 
In the 1960s and 70s Germany restruc-
tured its  power industry. Hard coal was 
decreased and gradually replaced by: oil 
in transportation, gas in heating, and nu-
clear power in power generation.
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which has also been confirmed in the Europe-
an Union’s regulation. At present, three Ger-
man hard coal mines are still managed by RAG 
Deutsche Steinkohle AG. They employ around 
9,800 people. 
In 2014, hard coal accounted for 12.6% of 
primary energy consumption, and lignite for 
12%. Coal is thus the most important fuel in 
the German economy after oil (35%). While al-
most 90% of hard coal is imported, all of Ger-
many’s lignite demand is satisfied by domestic 
producers. In 2013, hard coal output reached 
around 7.5 million tonnes, which accounted 
for around 12% of domestic consumption. The 
largest suppliers of hard coal in 2013 included 
Russia (12.5 million tonnes), the USA (12 million 
tonnes) and Columbia (10 million tonnes); im-
ports from Poland reached 3.4 million tonnes. 
70% of hard coal is burnt at power plants and 
combined heat and power plants, 28% is used 
as part of industrial processes and 2% for indi-
vidual needs. In turn, 90% of lignite is used by 
power plants, and the remaining 10% as part 
of industrial processes. Unlike with hard coal, 
lignite reserves in Germany are still high, and 
the industry is not subsidised. In 2013, Germany 
was the world’s largest lignite consumer, with 
an annual output of 183 million tonnes, follo-
wed by China (147 million tonnes), Russia (73 
million tonnes) and the USA (68.8 million ton-
nes). Estimated German lignite reserves stand 
at 35.1 billion tonnes. Lignite is produced in 
four mining regions: 
• the Rhenish  lignite  mining  region in North 
Rhine-Westphalia (53% of Germany’s output in 
2013), managed by Germany’s RWE; 
• the Lausitz lignite mining region n Branden-
burg (35% of Germany’s output in 2013), mana-
ged by Sweden’s Vattenfall; 
• Central German lignite mining region in Sa-
xony (11% of Germany’s output in 2013), mana-
ged by the Czech company EP Energy; 
• the Helmstedt lignite mining region on the 
border between Saxony-Anhalt and Saxony (1% 
of Germany’s output in 2013), managed by the 
Czech company EP Energy. 
Around 16,400 people are engaged in lignite-
mining, and around 70,000 (including co-ope-
rators) are employed in the lignite industry as 
a whole. This fuel has a number of economic, 
political and technical advantages.  Energy 
from lignite is cheap, and lignite power plants 
are used as base load power plants in the power 
supply system, i.e. they work uninterruptedly 
with fixed performance levels and are responsi-
ble for the stability of the power supply system. 
Furthermore, lignite is a domestic resource, and 
its production guarantees employment to many 
residents of Germany. Nevertheless, the use of 
lignite in Germany is a controversial issue. The 
main argument against lignite extraction is the 
impact it has on the environment – lignite cau-
ses the highest levels of emissions of all availa-
ble fuels and, furthermore, its production also 
causes deteriorating air quality, soil degrada-
tion, the reduction of crops, etc. Another ar-
gument against further use of lignite is the im-
pact it has on society – if RWE’s and Vattenfall’s 
plans to develop the queries are implemented, 
this will mean that around 10,000 people will 
be forced to relocate, and their homeland and 
material legacy will be irretrievably lost. 
As proven by the dispute over taxes on coal po-
wer plants, the political parties have no clear 
stance on the coal energy sector. At present, 
the CDU as a party which claims to have high 
economic competences is more willing to back 
the demands of the lignite sector. The German 
Green party in turn is clearly opposed to further 
use of lignite. The stances of the SPD and the 
Left Party (die Linke) are unclear. On the one 
Germany is the largest lignite consumer in 
the world - it uses almost three times more 
lignite than Poland. It is the second largest 
source of electricity, being surpassed by re-
newables in 2014.
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hand, the left-leaning politicians support the 
ambitious climate policy and the decarbonisa-
tion of the economy on the rhetorical level. On 
the other hand, local politicians from the SPD 
and the Left Party protect the interests of the 
coal industry in the regions they represent. 
The dim long-term perspective 
for coal in Germany
The overriding goal of all actions taken by the 
German government in the area of energy po-
licy is to implement the energy transition. This 
strategy envisages that 80% of electricity will 
be produced using renewable energy sources 
in 2050. Carbon emissions will be cut by at le-
ast 80% in 35 years, but the left of the political 
scene demands that the goal should be to redu-
ce them by 95% of 1990 levels. Climate policy 
goals of this type do not leave much room for 
the coal energy sector, and in particular, for li-
gnite, which is the source of the highest levels 
of emissions. The power supply system based 
on renewables will be supported by gas power 
plants, which will be able to use biogas or syn-
gas in the future. Furthermore, Germany stands 
for a decarbonisation of the economy and the 
reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions 
on the international forum. During the G7 su-
mmit in Elmau, Germany in June 2015, German 
representatives signed the Group’s declaration 
concerning the complete decarbonisation (re-
duction of carbon emissions to zero) by the end 
of this century. The Minister for the Environ-
ment, Barbara Hendricks (SPD), has emphasised 
that to reach the long-term climate policy ob-
jectives, the coal energy sector (this concerns 
both hard coal and lignite) must discontinue its 
operation in Germany by 2040–204510. In the 
medium term, the energy sector based on li-
10 Interview with Barbara Hendricks (SPD) for Die Zeit, ‘Wir 
müssen in den nächsten 25 bis 30 Jahren aussteigen’, 
26 June 2015, http://www.zeit.de/2015/28/barbara-hen-
dricks-kohle-energie-atommuell
gnite will most likely no longer be profitable in 
Germany. It may be concluded from an analysis 
developed by the German Institute for Econo-
mic Research (DIW) that building new ligni-
te power plants and new lignite mines is not 
economically viable. This has also been noticed 
by energy companies. Sweden’s Vattenfall has 
announced that it wants to sell its lignite po-
wer plants and mines in Germany by the end 
of 2015. It is unclear whether RWE’s project 
envisaging the construction of a new lignite 
power plant, known as BoAplus, in North Rhi-
ne-Westphalia will be implemented, since the 
future of this kind of investment is uncertain. 
Another factor which raises the level of risk in 
the case of coal investments is the negative 
perception of coal prevalent among the public. 
Both the Green Party and German ecological 
organisations insist that the coal energy sec-
tor needs to be dismantled by 2030. The ‘coal 
phase-out’ (German Kohleausstieg) may beco-
me as popular a political slogan in the future as 
was the ‘nuclear power phase-out’ (Atomaus-
stieg, in German). According to a poll conduc-
ted in February 2015, 19% of Germans want all 
coal power plants to be closed soon, and 48% 
want a coal phase-out in the medium term. Ho-
wever, as proven by the conflict over the clima-
te fee on coal power plants, there is a strong 
lignite lobby in Germany, and they are determi-
ned to protect their present assets. 
Taking into account the goals of the en-
ergy and climate policy, the government 
expects that hard coal and lignite power 
plants will be phased out by the year 2045 
at the latest.
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Source: AG Energiebilanzen e.V.
Primary energy consumption in West Germany in 1950–1990 
Source: AG Energiebilanzen e.V.
Primary energy consumption in East Germany in 1970–1990 
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